LEGAL DISCLAIMER: This article provides general, informational content for educational purposes only. It is not a substitute for professional legal advice from a qualified attorney. Always consult with a lawyer or a qualified tax professional for guidance on your specific legal and financial situation.
Imagine you own a small rental property. You hire a plumber to fix a leak, pay an accountant to manage the books, and buy supplies to maintain the building. You can deduct all these costs from your rental income because they are expenses of running a “business.” Now, imagine your “property” is a large stock portfolio. You hire a financial advisor, subscribe to research services, and rent a small office to manage your investments. Shouldn't you be able to deduct those costs, too? In 1941, the U.S. Supreme Court answered with a surprising “No.” The landmark case of Higgins v. Commissioner addressed this very question. A wealthy investor, Eugene Higgins, tried to deduct the salaries and office rent he paid to manage his massive personal portfolio. The irs denied the deductions, arguing that simply managing your own investments—no matter how actively—isn't a “trade or business.” The Supreme Court agreed, creating a major problem for every serious investor in America. The ruling was so unpopular and economically problematic that Congress stepped in just one year later to “fix” it, passing a new law that fundamentally changed how investment expenses are treated. This case is the perfect story of how a court decision can lead directly to a major legislative change, with consequences that impact your taxes to this day.
To understand Higgins v. Commissioner, you have to travel back to the 1930s. The U.S. tax code was far simpler than it is today, but one phrase was a constant source of conflict: “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred… in carrying on any trade or business.” For business owners, this was straightforward. The cost of goods, employee salaries, rent for a factory—all were clearly deductible. But what about individuals who didn't run a traditional company? Enter Eugene Higgins. He was a U.S. citizen living in Paris, France, but he had a vast portfolio of real estate, stocks, and bonds back in the United States. Managing these assets was a full-time job, not just for him, but for a staff he employed in New York City. He paid salaries to bookkeepers and assistants, rented office space, and incurred other costs solely to oversee his investments and collect the income they generated. When he filed his taxes, he did what seemed logical: he deducted these management expenses. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the head of what we now call the irs) flagged his return. The government's position was simple and unyielding: Mr. Higgins was not running a business. He was a passive investor, and the costs of watching over your own money were personal expenses, no different from hiring someone to mow your lawn. They were not deductible. Higgins disagreed and took his fight through the court system, all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The stage was set for a fundamental decision: where does personal financial management end and a “trade or business” begin?
The entire legal battle in Higgins v. Commissioner hinged on the interpretation of a single phrase in the Revenue Act of 1932, Section 23(a). The statute stated:
“In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: (a) Expenses. – All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business…”
The law provided no clear definition of “trade or business.” This ambiguity was the heart of the conflict.
The Supreme Court had to draw a line in the sand. Its decision would affect not just multimillionaires like Higgins, but anyone who spent money to generate investment income.
While Higgins v. Commissioner was a federal case setting a national precedent, its core logic helped solidify a critical distinction in tax law that exists today: the difference between an “investor” and a “trader.” Understanding your classification is essential because it dictates which expenses you can deduct. The Court decided Higgins was an investor. This table breaks down the practical differences, which are a direct legacy of the reasoning in the *Higgins* case.
| Feature | Investor (Like Higgins) | Trader (Qualifies as a “Business”) |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Goal | Long-term growth, dividends, and interest. Capital appreciation over months or years. | Short-term profits from frequent buying and selling based on market swings. |
| Activity Level | Manages portfolio, makes periodic adjustments. Can be substantial but is not continuous daily trading. | Substantial, frequent, and continuous. Trading is the primary daily activity. |
| Source of Profit | Dividends, interest, and long-term `capital gains`. | Short-term gains from daily market movements. |
| Tax Treatment of Expenses | Expenses fall under `internal_revenue_code_section_212`. Deductible as “miscellaneous itemized deductions” (currently suspended for individuals by the TCJA). | Expenses are `trade_or_business` expenses. Deductible “above the line” on Schedule C, directly reducing business income. |
| What this means for you: | If you are a typical buy-and-hold investor, the IRS considers you an investor. Your ability to deduct fees is currently limited. | If you make dozens of trades per day as your main job, you might qualify as a trader, which offers much better tax benefits for your expenses. |
The Supreme Court's 1941 decision was concise and, for investors, devastating. The Court did not get bogged down in the details of Higgins's specific expenses. Instead, it focused entirely on the high-level legal question.
Higgins's legal team presented a compelling, real-world argument. They emphasized the scope and regularity of his financial activities. They pointed out that he employed a staff, maintained a dedicated office, and engaged in continuous oversight of his properties and securities. In their view, if an activity is continuous, regular, and the taxpayer's primary occupation for the production of income, it should qualify as a trade or business, regardless of whether it has “customers.”
The government's counterargument was elegantly simple. A `trade_or_business`, they contended, inherently involves holding oneself out to others as offering goods or services. A manufacturer sells products. A lawyer sells legal services. A doctor sells medical care. Eugene Higgins, they argued, was his own (and only) customer. He was managing his own assets for his own benefit. This was the pinnacle of personal financial activity, not a commercial enterprise.
The nine justices of the Supreme Court had to answer this fundamental question:
Does the management of one's own extensive investment portfolio, requiring regular and continuous effort, constitute “carrying on any trade or business” within the meaning of the federal tax code?
In an 8-0 decision, the Supreme Court sided with the Commissioner. Justice Reed, writing for the Court, stated that Higgins's activities were “no more than receipts of interest, dividends, and rents.” The Court acknowledged the “personal attention” Higgins gave to his investments but ultimately concluded:
“No matter how large the estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be, such facts are not sufficient as a matter of law to permit the courts to reverse the decision of the Board [of Tax Appeals].”
The Court's rationale was that Higgins was merely conserving and managing his own wealth. This was seen as fundamentally different from a commercial venture that serves the public or a specific market. The ruling established a bright-line rule: managing your own investments is not a business.
The Supreme Court's decision in Higgins v. Commissioner was not the end of the story—it was the beginning. The ruling created an outcry because it was fundamentally unfair. People who earned income from investments were being taxed on their gross income without being able to deduct the legitimate costs of earning it. Congress recognized this immediately.
The most important legacy of the *Higgins* case is not the ruling itself, but the law Congress created to overturn it: Section 23(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1942, which lives on today as `internal_revenue_code_section_212`. This section allows for the deduction of expenses related to producing income. Here is how to navigate its modern application.
First, determine if you are an “investor” or a “trader” using the table in Part 1. The vast majority of people who manage their own portfolios, even very actively, are considered investors. If you believe you qualify as a trader—meaning you make hundreds of trades a year and it's your primary source of income—you should consult a tax professional immediately, as the rules are complex but much more favorable. The rest of this guide assumes you are an investor.
Section 212 allows investors to deduct “ordinary and necessary” expenses for the production of income. Before 2018, this was a huge benefit. Common examples included:
This is the most critical step for today's taxpayers. The `tax_cuts_and_jobs_act_of_2017` (TCJA) brought a massive, though temporary, change. It suspended all miscellaneous itemized deductions that are subject to the 2% of adjusted_gross_income floor. What this means for you: From tax years 2018 through 2025, individual investors cannot deduct the Section 212 expenses listed above on their federal tax returns. Financial advisor fees, newsletter subscriptions, and other investment management costs are currently not deductible. While the *Higgins* case led to a law allowing these deductions, a more recent law has temporarily taken them away. Unless Congress acts to extend the suspension, these deductions are scheduled to return in 2026.
Even with the current suspension, it is vital to maintain meticulous records of all investment-related expenses.
This practice is crucial because the law may change again, and you will need these records to claim deductions if they are reinstated.
The impact of Higgins v. Commissioner is best understood not by the ruling itself, but by the chain reaction it caused in both Congress and the courts.
Within a year of the Supreme Court's decision, Congress acted decisively. Lawmakers understood that the *Higgins* ruling created an unfair system. The Senate Finance Committee report from 1942 explicitly stated that the new law was intended to correct the “inequity” of the existing code, which “did not provide for a deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses of an individual engaged in the production of income.” The resulting legislation, now codified as `internal_revenue_code_section_212`, was a direct and intentional reversal of the *Higgins* outcome. It created a new category of deductions separate from “trade or business” expenses. Section 212 allows individuals to deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred for:
This was the true legacy of the *Higgins* case: it forced the creation of a more equitable tax system for investors that lasted for 75 years until the TCJA.
Decades later, the Supreme Court revisited the “trade or business” question in `commissioner_v_groetzinger`. The case involved a full-time gambler who argued his gambling was a trade or business, allowing him to deduct his losses. The Court agreed with him, establishing a new test for what constitutes a “trade or business”:
“We accept the factfinder's conclusion that petitioner's gambling activity was pursued full time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere hobby. It is here that the taxpayer differs from the pure investor in Higgins.”
The *Groetzinger* case is important because it clarified the *Higgins* standard. While an investor like Higgins was not in a business, a person could be—even in an unconventional field like gambling—if their involvement was regular, continuous, and their primary purpose was for income or profit. This case helps define the high bar one must clear to be considered a “trader” rather than an “investor.”
The TCJA of 2017 represents the most significant recent development in the *Higgins* story. By suspending miscellaneous itemized deductions, the TCJA temporarily reverted the tax situation for most investors back to something resembling the pre-1942, post-*Higgins* world. For the tax years 2018-2025, an investor paying a 1% advisory fee on a $1 million portfolio ($10,000 per year) cannot deduct any of that fee. This has had a profound impact on the financial planning industry and individual investors' tax strategies. It highlights how a legislative act can, for a time, completely neutralize the remedy that was put in place to fix a problematic court ruling.
The principles debated in Higgins v. Commissioner are alive and well in the 21st century, particularly in the world of digital assets. The irs is actively grappling with how to classify the activities of cryptocurrency participants.
The future promises even more complexity. As technology continues to evolve, new challenges to the *Higgins* framework will emerge.
The central question remains the same as it was in 1941: What activities, short of running a traditional company, are so involved in the production of income that their costs should be tax-deductible? The answer will continue to evolve with our economy.